> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.tuteliq.ai/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
# MCP Tool Reference
> Every tool exposed by the Tuteliq MCP server, grouped by purpose, plus the full list of tools that change or delete data.
Around 80 tools across nine groups. Every tool carries MCP annotations, so a host can tell read-only from destructive before invoking anything.
Detection quality matches the REST API exactly. Both surfaces are backed by the same tool definitions from the `@tuteliq/mcp` package.
## Detection
| Tool | Purpose |
| ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| `detect_grooming` | Predatory patterns across an adult-to-minor conversation |
| `detect_bullying` | Harassment, exclusion, intimidation, gaming toxicity |
| `detect_unsafe` | Self-harm, violence, hate, threats, sexual content |
| `analyze` | Quick combined safety check |
| `analyse_multi` | Up to 10 detectors over one text in a single call |
| `batch_analyze` | Up to 50 items in one request, for bulk triage |
| `analyze_emotions` | Emotional state indicators across a conversation |
Grooming is scoped to adult-to-minor dynamics. If every participant is a known adult the endpoint short-circuits and says so; use coercive control or social engineering instead.
## Fraud and exploitation
| Tool | Purpose |
| ----------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `detect_social_engineering` | Pretexting, urgency fabrication, authority impersonation |
| `detect_app_fraud` | Fake investment platforms, phishing apps, subscription traps |
| `detect_romance_scam` | Love-bombing, financial requests, identity deception |
| `detect_mule_recruitment` | Money mule recruitment and account-sharing offers |
| `detect_gambling_harm` | Chasing losses, concealment, underage gambling |
| `detect_coercive_control` | Isolation, financial control, monitoring, threats |
| `detect_vulnerability_exploitation` | Targeting of elderly, disabled or financially distressed people |
| `detect_radicalisation` | Extremist rhetoric, us-versus-them framing, ideological grooming |
| `detect_tfgbv` | Technology-facilitated gender-based violence |
| `detect_distress_signals` | Acute distress indicators |
| `detect_emotional_distress` | Sustained emotional-harm patterns |
## Media
| Tool | Purpose |
| ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `analyze_image` | Visual safety analysis plus OCR text extraction |
| `analyze_voice` | Transcription, then safety analysis of the transcript |
| `analyze_video` | Key-frame extraction and analysis (mp4, mov, avi, webm, mkv) |
| `analyze_document` | Per-page multi-endpoint PDF analysis with chain-of-custody hashing |
Media costs more than text: an image is 7 credits, a voice clip 21, a video 95. See [credits](/credits).
## Synthetic content
`detect_synthetic_text`, `detect_synthetic_image`, `detect_synthetic_audio` and `detect_synthetic_video` identify AI-generated media in each modality.
## Incidents and moderation
| Tool | Purpose |
| ------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `get_incidents_overview` | Queue snapshot with breakdowns by category, severity, source, status |
| `list_incidents` | Filterable queue, each row carrying `recommended_actions` |
| `moderation_queue` | Prioritised working set in one call |
| `get_incident` | Full record for one incident |
| `get_incident_trends` | Counts bucketed by hour, day or week |
| `review_incident` | Record a moderator decision |
| `batch_review_incidents` | One decision across up to 100 incidents |
Agents are limited to `confirm` on the review tools. See [moderation workflows](/mcp-server/moderation#what-an-agent-may-decide).
## Guidance and reporting
`get_action_plan` produces age-appropriate guidance for responding to a situation. `generate_report` produces an incident report suitable for professional review.
## Governance and compliance
| Tool | Purpose |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `get_audit_receipt` | Signed EU AI Act Article 12 receipt for a specific request |
| `get_audit_logs` | Account-level action history |
| `register_encryption_key` | Register or rotate an RSA public key for end-to-end encryption |
| `get_encryption_key` | Fetch the currently registered key |
| `revoke_encryption_key` | Revoke it; new incidents fall back to server-side encryption |
| `export_account_data` | GDPR Article 20, portability |
| `rectify_data` | GDPR Article 16, correction |
| `delete_account_data` | GDPR Article 17, erasure |
| `record_consent`, `get_consent_status`, `withdraw_consent` | Consent ledger |
| `log_breach`, `list_breaches`, `get_breach`, `update_breach_status` | Breach register for Article 33 |
Set expectations correctly on erasure: Tuteliq stores no user content in the first place. An erasure request removes the abstracted detection records, and cannot remove message text because none was ever kept. That is usually a stronger answer than a completed deletion, and worth stating plainly.
## Policy and automation
`get_policy` and `set_policy` manage account-wide thresholds. `list_policy_rules`, `create_policy_rule`, `get_policy_rule`, `update_policy_rule`, `delete_policy_rule` and `evaluate_policy_rules` drive rule-based automation. `get_detection_settings`, `update_detection_settings` and `reset_detection_settings` tune detector behaviour.
## Threat intelligence
`get_intelligence_trends`, `get_emerging_threats`, `get_risk_trends` and `get_weekly_digest` surface cross-account, k-anonymised threat signals.
## Verification, usage and webhooks
`create_verification_session`, `get_verification_session` and `cancel_verification_session` drive age and identity verification.
`get_usage_history`, `get_usage_by_tool`, `get_usage_monthly`, `get_usage_summary`, `get_usage_quota`, `get_pricing` and `get_pricing_details` cover consumption and billing.
`list_webhooks`, `create_webhook`, `update_webhook`, `delete_webhook`, `test_webhook` and `regenerate_webhook_secret` manage event delivery.
## Tools that change or delete data
Most tools are read-only. These are annotated `destructiveHint`, so a host can prompt before invoking them. Worth reviewing before granting an agent access to a production account.
| Tool | Effect |
| ------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `delete_account_data` | Erases account data under GDPR Article 17. Not recoverable |
| `revoke_encryption_key` | New incidents fall back to server-side encryption; existing records stay readable only with the prior key |
| `rectify_data` | Amends stored records |
| `withdraw_consent` | Amends the consent ledger |
| `set_policy` | Changes detection thresholds account-wide |
| `update_detection_settings`, `reset_detection_settings` | Change detector behaviour account-wide |
| `update_policy_rule`, `delete_policy_rule` | Change or remove automation rules |
| `review_incident` | Records a moderator decision |
| `batch_review_incidents` | Records one decision across up to 100 incidents |
| `update_webhook`, `delete_webhook` | Change or remove event delivery |
| `regenerate_webhook_secret` | Invalidates the existing secret; receivers must be updated |
| `cancel_verification_session` | Ends a verification in progress |
| `update_breach_status` | Amends the breach register |
## Common parameters
Detection tools share a common set:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| ----------------------------- | ------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `content` | string | Yes | Text to analyse |
| `context` | object | No | Ages, relationship, platform and language hints |
| `include_evidence` | boolean | No | Return supporting excerpts with flagged phrases and weights |
| `support_threshold` | string | No | Minimum severity to include crisis helplines. `critical` always includes them |
| `external_id`, `customer_id` | string | No | Your identifiers, echoed in the response |
| `incident_moderation_enabled` | boolean | No | Override incident logging for this call: `true` forces it, `false` suppresses it. Omit for your account default. See [incident logging](/incident-logging#per-call-override) |
| `verdict_only` | boolean | No | Fast mode: verdict without the per-message breakdown |
`verdict_only` is the right trade when screening a live stream: screen everything fast, then re-run only what flags in standard mode for the detail.